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  As much as by luck as by design, China stumbled onto an export and 
foreign investment strategy that has proved remarkably successful, helping  
  the economy move quickly to a market-based system.  But can the Chinese 
experience serve as a model for other countries? 
 
  After three decades of inward-oriented trade and foreign investment 
policies, in 1979, China switched course and launched an "open-door" policy. 
  During the 15 years that have elapsed since then, the country has 
persistently, albeit gradually, liberalized its trade and foreign investment 
regime.  This has been accompanied by a spectacular growth in GDP and 
foreign trade.  During 1980-90, GDP grew annually at an impressive rate of 
9.5 percent.  Over the same period, exports grew at an annual rate of 11 
percent--more than twice as fast as world trade--and imports 9.8 percent.   
More recently, in 1992 and 1993, GDP has shown annual growth rates exceeding 
13 percent.  The annual growth in exports and imports during these two years 
has been 13 percent and 27 percent, respectively.  
  What are the key trade and foreign investment policies that have led 
to this dramatic growth in China's foreign trade and GDP?  And what lessons 
can we derive from China's experience for other economies in transition? 
(see box)?  In the following, we examine the nature of reforms and why they 
worked well or poorly in particular cases. Though this study focuses on 
external economic policies, it is important to remember that the promotion 
of non-state enterprises has closely complemented China's outward-oriented   - 2 - 
 
strategy.  These enterprises, owned collectively by local authorities in 
urban areas, townships or villages, enjoy a high degree of autonomy in their 
operations. Consequently, they have been most successful in taking advantage 
of the outward-oriented strategy. 
Promoting an "export culture" 
  On the external front, three factors combined to give rise to China's 
success:  adoption of an aggressive pro-export strategy by central 
authorities, active participation of local authorities and the presence of 
Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors looking for a source of cheap labor.  With 
the beginning of the open-door policy, the central authorities began sending 
clear signals in favor of an export-oriented trade regime.  A variety of 
instruments were employed to promote what may be called an "export culture": 
geographical targeting, sectoral targeting, a liberal foreign investment 
regime, and liberal provision of export financing. 
 Geographical  targeting. China set up the so-called Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) and Open  Cities within which economic activities--
manufacturing, banking, exporting and importing, and foreign investment--
took place in a more liberal environment than is available in the rest of 
the economy. These zones helped to serve as focal points for investment from 
both domestic and foreign sources and to allow China to develop links with 
the world market, brought in part, by Hong Kong and Taiwanese entrepreneurs. 
  Originally there were only a handful of such zones, all in Guangdong 
and Fujian provinces. Over time, many features of SEZs were extended to 
other cities. Two features of SEZs distinguish them from the rest of the 
country.  First, the SEZs enjoy considerable administrative autonomy in the   - 3 - 
 
areas of investment, pricing, taxation, housing, and labor and land 
management policies.  Most foreign investments can be approved locally and 
require virtually no central clearance.  Second, the SEZs offer many 
economic incentives to investors not available in the inland provinces.  The 
corporate income tax, normally 33 percent for foreign funded enterprises and 
55 percent for state owned enterprises, is 15 percent for all enterprises in 
the SEZs.  All imported inputs used in exports or sold within the Zones are 
free of import duty and other indirect taxes.  In addition, tax holidays 
available to foreign funded enterprises are more generous in the SEZs than 
those available under the national tax legislation.  Depending on the amount 
of investment, nature of the technology, and duration of the project, tax 
holidays of up to five years are available. 
  The SEZs and open cities exhibited spectacular economic performance. 
In 1979, the three SEZs in Guangdong were small fishing villages with 
virtually no industrial activity.  By the end of 1980s, they had been 
transformed into modern cities.  In 1990, the SEZs and open cities accounted 
for 52% of total realized investment and more than half of total exports.  
During 1985-90, industrial output in Guangdong and Fujian grew at annual 
rates of 16% and 14.7%  compared with 6.9% in the rest of the economy. 
 Sectoral  targeting. Side by side with geographical targeting, China 
has also engaged in sectoral targeting for exports.  Targeted sectors, 
chosen at a broad level, have included light industrial products, textiles, 
and machinery and electronic goods.  The most important instruments of 
targeting were production networks for exports (PNEs) and higher exchange 
retention rights to targeted sectors.   - 4 - 
 
  The Seventh Five Year Plan (1986-90) provided for the creation of 
PNEs.  The idea was to bring the leading factories within the targeted 
sector into a network and support them through subsidies for technological 
upgrading, guaranteed supplies of raw materials and power, preferential 
access to transportation, attractive purchase prices for their goods, and 
higher exchange-retention rights than other enterprises in the same 
industry.  The aim of the networks was to expand both the quailty and 
quantity of exports of the participating factories. The first industry group 
to benefit from this scheme was machinery and electronic goods. PNEs have 
also been created in light industrial products and textiles, and farm and 
sideline products. 
  Rights to foreign exchange generated by exports are shared between the 
central and provincial governments.  For targeted sectors, the allocation of 
retention rights was more favorable to the province and the foreign trade 
corporations (FTCs), which procure and export more than 80 percent of 
China's exports.  In the case of light industries, arts & craft, and 
knitwear, foreign exchange was divided in the ratio of 20:80 between the 
center and province.  Similarly, in machinery and electronic goods, for 
within-quota exports, the split between the center and provinces was 35:65. 
 Though the retention rights have been revised recently, the bias in favor 
of FTCs has been retained. 
  From the available data, it is difficult to judge the impact of 
sectoral targeting primarily because it was broad based.  The share of 
textiles and light industrial products in total exports did expand 
significantly after 1985.  But the effect on machinery sector is less clear.   - 5 - 
 
  Overall, one thing which is clear, however, is that the export share of 
labor intensive sector has gone up in the latter half of 1980s.  In 1982, 
export shares of heavy and light industries were 47.5% and 37.6%, 
respectively, in 1982.  By 1989, these shares had changed to 31.9% and 
52.9%. 
  Liberal foreign investment regime. China's striking export performance 
is related to the size of foreign direct investment flows into the country 
(see table). Foreign investors have been lured to the Chinese market for 
three reasons. 
  First, both policies and procedures have been designed to facilitate 
foreign investment.  A 25 percent foreign investment gives an enterprise the 
status of a joint venture and qualifies it for various tax incentives.  At 
the same time, foreign equity investment can rise all the way up to 100 
percent.  Restrictions on the choice of sectors are minimal; any 
preferences, sectoral or otherwise, take the form of extra incentives. As a 
result, joint ventures have been established in sectors ranging from high-
technology to consumer goods, services, and raw materials.  There is no 
lower or upper limit on the amount of foreign investment.  In large open 
cities such as Shanghai, foreign investment projects up to $30 million can 
be approved by local authorities.  The limit in smaller open cities is $10 
million while that in unopened cities is $3 million.  This autonomy has 
greatly simplified the approval procedures. 
  Second, employment, wage and pricing policies for joint ventures are 
flexible.  Joint ventures are free to employ any required personnel on a 
contractual basis.  Employees are subject to warnings, wage cuts and   - 6 - 
 
dismissal.  Except for a few product categories for which prices are set by 
the state, joint ventures are free to set their prices both domestically and 
abroad.  Products or services for which prices are fixed are of two types.  
In the first category, prices are completely fixed (e.g., products such as 
grain, oil, and fuel; and services such as electricity and rent).  In the 
second category, prices are allowed to fluctuate within prespecified bands 
usually ranging from 10 to 30 percent (e.g., steel, cement, timber, coal and 
other major capital goods). 
  Finally, China has given extra incentives to joint ventures.  As 
already discussed, these incentives are particularly generous in the SEZs 
and open cities.  Since 1986, additional preferential treatment has been 
available to export-oriented or technologically advanced projects.  The 
incentives include: 
  o Exemption from state subsidies paid to employees to cover the 
benefits provided by the government of China;  
  o Priority in obtaining Bank of China loans;  
  o Tax exemption on profits remitted abroad;  
  o Longer tax holidays from corporate income tax;  
  o Extra tax benefits on profits reinvested in export-oriented or 
technologically advanced projects; and  
  o Further reduced land-use fees, priority in obtaining utilities, 
transport, and communication facilities. 
 Duty  exemptions.  China has also instituted an elaborate system of 
duty exemptions on imported inputs used in exports.  Under these schemes, 
the concessional share of imports was 35 percent in 1988 and rose to 50   - 7 - 
 
percent in 1991.  The schemes, introduced in 1984 or later, seem to have 
played an important role in expanding China's exports.  Total exports 
associated with concessional import arrangements account for 64 percent of 
China's manufactured exports.  These exports doubled between 1988 and 1991. 
  The domestic value added of these exports is, of course, lower than of 
other exports. 
 Export  financing.  Ready access to export credits is believed to 
contribute favorably to export performance.  The Bank of China, which is the 
primary bank dealing in foreign exchange, provides trade credits. Credit, 
offered in domestic currency, is available for working capital as well as 
fixed investment for the production of exports and import substitutes.  The 
main beneficiaries of these credits are FTCs.  They accounted for 85 percent 
of total trade credits in 1991.  The Bank of China also offers loans in 
terms of foreign exchange, primarily to enterprises in which foreigners have 
invested, for working capital and fixed investment. 
  Though contributing favorably to exports, the liberal credit policy 
has led to a rapid expansion of outstanding loans.  The total volume of 
outstanding trade loans at the end of 1991 was more than three time that at 
the end of 1985.  In part, this expansion was due to the growth of exports. 
  But perhaps it also reflects a rising ratio of export credit to total 
exports.  According to one calculation, this ratio was 150 percent in 1988. 
The Hong Kong connection 
  A key element in China's success in the world markets  has been the 
so-called "Hong Kong connection".  In the mid-1980s, Hong Kong entrepreneurs 
began shifting manufacturing facilities to China, attracted by lower labor   - 8 - 
 
costs as wages rose rapidly at home. This link with Hong Kong has not only 
brought much needed capital to China but also supplied new technology, 
modern management practices and critical links to the world market. Today 
more than half of China's exports to the rest of the world are handled by 
Hong Kong.  Of the $45 billion in cumulative foreign investment commitments 
to China through 1992, 70 percent came from Hong Kong. This investment went 
mainly to export-oriented joint ventures. A large proportion of Guangdong's 
export production is supervised under contract by firms in Hong Kong.   
Processing activity for exports in Guangdong is also carried out largely in 
collaboration with partners in Hong Kong who supply materials.  Many items, 
particularly in the toy and clothing sectors, which were previously exported 
by Hong Kong are now exported by Guangdong. 
Local policies 
  China's economic system is highly decentralized now and the 
implementation of policy is largely under the control of provinces. Hence, 
in the fast-growing provinces, provincial and local officials have been 
deeply involved in the development process in general and export promotion 
in particular. The role of local authorities in facilitating foreign 
investment has been described earlier.  In addition, there are a number of 
ways in which local authorities promote exports.  
  First, the center gives mandatory targets or export quotas for only a 
limited number of items or in limited volumes.  But in some provinces, for 
example Jiangsu, the export-quota-system is far more elaborate.  Moreover, 
taking advantage of their monopsony power, FTCs are able to buy goods from 
enterprises at prices well below the corresponding domestic prices.  Though   - 9 - 
 
the economic desirability of "exports at any cost" has been questioned, the 
FTCs have certainly been able to operate profitably on account of the 
monopsony power. 
 
  Second, operating within the center's guidelines, provincial 
authorities have been expanding Direct Export Rights (DERs) to enterprises. 
 Because the criteria for obtaining such rights are stringent, the DERs have 
not expanded as rapidly as would have been desirable, however.  Enterprises 
with DERs account for only 5% of China's exports. 
  Third, within the State's guidelines, provincial and city governments 
decide the allocation of raw materials imported by using locally retained 
foreign exchange earnings among enterprises, collectives and TVEs and across 
different sectors.  Provinces and cities also provide indirect export 
subsidies through the provision of critical inputs such as electric power to 
export oriented enterprises.  Further incentives are provided in the form of 
higher bonuses for managers and employees on the basis of export 
performance.  Within the guidelines laid down by the State, provinces can 
confer rights to trade directly upon enterprises and enterprise groups. 
  Finally, local authorities establish joint ventures between FTCs and 
enterprises to promote exports.  During the Seventh Plan, Wuxi City alone 
established 160 of these ventures.  In the Eighth Plan, the city intended to 
establish another 200 such ventures. 
The central lesson 
  Perhaps the most important lesson, also consistent with the experience 
of other East Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan Province of China,   - 10 - 
 
Singapore and now Thailand, is that the key to high GDP growth rates is 
export orientation and eventual success in the world market.  The success in 
export expansion, in turn, depends on the policy package, which conveys a 
message in no uncertain terms that, rather than shelter import competing 
industries, the country will give priority to export oriented activities. 
  China benefitted greatly from the clarity of signals sent by its 
policy reforms.  Once the reform process began, there was rarely any doubt 
about its direction.  Despite occasional policy reversals, provincial and 
city governments, which implemented policies and enterprises, both state and 
nonstate, were convinced that the country was headed towards an export 
oriented regime.  In terms of static efficiency, virtually all policies--
geographical targeting, preferential treatment of foreign investment in 
general and in export sectors in particular, and discriminatory exchange 
retention rights--were highly distortionary.  Yet, they combined to give a 
loud and clear signal that the government was determined to change the 
economy's orientation away from import substitution to export promotion.   - 11 - 
 
Box 
              Can India benefit from China's experience? 
  Operationally, the Chinese model is not very applicable to the 
economies of Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union.  These countries 
have largely rejected the planning model, which has remained an integral 
part of the Chinese development strategy.  The countries in Eastern Europe 
have already evolved far closer to the market model than China.  The 
countries emerging out of the former Soviet Union, on the other hand, are 
still struggling with the problem of macroeconomic stabilization. 
  The country for which the Chinese experience is most relevant is 
India. Both are highly populous and, by developing-country standards, large 
economies. They began their development process approximately at the same 
time and stressed self-reliance. Both relied increasingly heavily on import 
substitution policies and ended up with a highly capital intensive 
production structure. China changed course in 1979 while India continued 
(with modest liberalization) on the old course. In 1991, in many ways, India 
stood where China stood in 1979.  The trade-to-GDP ratio was the same as 
China's in 1979. Import and investment controls were rampant and the 
domestic currency was overvalued. 
  Despite these similarities, even in India's case, lessons from China 
are limited. In addition to the obvious differences in political systems 
which lead to very different political-economy processes in the two 
countries, there are three reasons for this.  First, the Chinese approach 
has been highly interventionist.  This approach can be successful--as it has 
been in China and elsewhere in East Asia--provided the government can   - 12 - 
 
implement "right" interventions judiciously.  India's experience during the 
last four decades in this respect has not been encouraging.  Second, India's 
economy has already evolved far closer to a market economy than that of 
China.  For instance, export targets and foreign exchange contracts, which 
have arguably helped create a pro-exports ethos in China are neither 
desirable nor feasible in India.  Similarly, private sector plays a far 
greater role in India than in China.  Finally, India has already carried out 
many reforms that China is still contemplating.  For example, in the area of 
exchange rate, China has a multiple exchange rate system and its exchange 
market is not organized along the lines of market economies.  India has 
achieved virtual current account convertibility and its foreign exchange 
market is organized along modern lines. 
  Of the lessons that have general relevance to India, the following 
points would seem to be the most pertinent.  
  o First, creating a liberal and flexible economic environment along 
the lines of SEZs in China would stimulate greater foreign investment.  The 
country can begin with a small number of cities--e.g., Bombay, Bangalore, 
Cochin, and Madras--and, as in China, local governments may be given full 
authority to approve foreign investment up to a certain limit.  Most 
important, rules of entry and exit in the zones can be made more flexible.  
Because these zones will be introduced in limited areas with a high growth 
potential, political consensus may be easier, even if this requires new 
legislation.  Eventual success in the open zones may open the way for 
political consensus on a wider scale.  Currently, India does have export 
processing zones.  But the geographical area over which such zones operate   - 13 - 
 
is far too limited to allow for the full play of liberal policies and make 
them focal points of investment activity. 
  o Second, provision of infrastructure facilities through active 
participation of local authorities in the reform process is critical.  In 
the fast growing provinces in China, local authorities--especially mayors of 
the cities--have been deeply involved in the process of development.  They 
try to ensure that investors get speedy clearance with respect to land use, 
supply of electricity, water and other facilities.  In India, so far, it 
seems that the enthusiasm for reforms has not filtered to state governments 
and the center may well have to take a lead in this regard, offering both 
carrot and stick.  All incentives and reforms at the central level can be 
rendered ineffective if the state and local authorities, which must provide 
land, power, communications facilities, and environmental clearance, do not 
cooperate.  There is an urgent need to study caefully how such bottlenecks 
can be removed. 
  o Third, there is a need for a shift in the production structure 
towards more labor intensive industries.  The share of capital goods imports 
in total imports is rather small in India when compared with China and other 
fast-growing countries in East Asia.  This, combined with the fact that 
India's import-to-GDP ratio is small, suggests that India is far more deeply 
into the production of capital goods than China and other comparator 
countries.  
  In late 1970s and early 1980s, China also suffered from this problem 
and adopted policies to change the structure of production in favor of labor 
intensive goods.  An important part of this strategy was targeting of a few   - 14 - 
 
sectors, especially for exports.  For India, it is perhaps unwise to follow 
this route.  Given the country's generally neutral and rules-based approach 
to reforms, it is perhaps best to rely on the standard trade policy tools, 
particularly the structure of tariffs.  Recent reduction in tariffs on 
capital goods should help move the economy towards more labor intensive 
goods.  What is needed is resistance to policies that reverse the impact of 
this policy change. In particular, there is need for labor-market reforms.  
The country will not be able to take advantage of low wages of skilled and 
unskilled labor unless potential investors are sure that they can operate 
factories around the year without fears of recurrent labor disputes.  This 
fear has been behind the highly capital intensive technologies chosen by 
investors in recent years. 
  o Fourth, duty exemptions for assembly type operations combined with 
rapid processing of imported inputs and materials by customs authorities 
made a significant contribution to China's export growth.  In India, duty 
exemptions for exporters exist but an improvement in their administration 
and simplification of procedures leading to speedy processing by customs 
will help boost exports.  Also, for small exporters who rely on duty 
drawbacks, delay in getting the drawback as well as in obtaining inputs from 
abroad are common.  An improvement in this direction is also desirable. 
  o Fifth, it is important to note that China was welcoming of foreign 
investment for both domestic and foreign markets.  Most of the incentives-- 
tax holidays, lower fees on land use, flexibility in the employment of labor 
etc.,--were available to all foreign investors.  For export-oriented joint 
ventures, some extra incentives were provided.  The lesson here is that   - 15 - 
 
fears of tariff-jumping type of foreign investment should not lead to 
erection of barriers.  Instead, if the regime is to be tilted in favor of 
export-oriented foreign investments, it should be done through positive 
incentives.  Imposition of barriers to foreign investment will only add 
noise to signals of openness that India has been sending. 
  A final point concerns the importance of a "Hong Kong" connection. In 
India's case, there are no geographic neighbors that are as economically 
dynamic as Hong Kong or Taiwan, Province of China.  But through cultural 
ties, the most India can do is to attract investments from Indians in Hong 
Kong and Non Resident Indians (NRIs) elsewhere in the world.  While this is 
obviously worth doing, India has to rely on a more diversified base of 
foreign investors.  It may be argued that to meet the East Asian challenge, 
investors in the United States and Europe will be increasingly looking for 
sources of cheap labor.  With its vast pool of cheap unskilled to middle-
level skilled labor, India clearly fulfills this requirement.  Moreover, 
India's economic and political institutions are also familiar to western 
investors.  What is needed is more open policies, transparency, and 
infrastructure.  If this can be accomplished, India may well become the 
primary export base for the United States and European Community in the 21st 
century. 
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  Direct foreign investment into China 
 (billion  dollars) 
                                Commitment          Actual 
1988         5.3    n.a. 
1989         5.6      3.4 
1990         6.6      3.5 
1991       12.0      4.4 
1992  (first  half)     14.5      3.4 
Cumulative,  end  1991    48.9    20.3 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
    Sources: China Statistics Yearbook 1990, 1991, Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade, China. 